Ludwig Wittgenstein

Ludwig Wittgenstein (April 26, 1889 - April 29, 1951) Austrian philosopher

Table of contents

1 Notes from 1916 2 Notes and Letters of 1919 3 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922) 4 Notes of 1946 5 Philosophical Investigations 6 On Certainty 7 Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough

Notes from 1916

• What do I know about God and the purpose of life?
  I know that this world exists.

• The meaning of life, i.e. the meaning of the world, we can call God.

• To pray is to think about the meaning of life.

• To believe in God means to see that the facts of the world are not the end of the matter.
  To believe in God means to see that life has a meaning.

• Certainly it is correct to say: Conscience is the voice of God.

• Man is the microcosm: I am my world.

• Ethics and Aesthetics are one.

Notes and Letters of 1919

• That all elementary props are given is SHOWN by there being none having an elementary sense which is not given.

• I once wanted to give a few words in the foreword which now actually are not in it, which, however, I'll write to you now because they might be a key for you: I wanted to write that my work consists of two parts: of the one which is here, and of everything which I have not written. And precisely this second part is the important one.
  • Letter to Ludwig von Ficker, 1919

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922)

• . The whole sense of the book might be summed up the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence
  • Introduction

• The world is all that is the case. (1)

• The world is the totality of facts, not things. (1.1)

• Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the clarification of propositions. Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries. (4.112)

• It is quite impossible for a proposition to state that it itself is true. (4.442)

• A tautology's truth is certain, a proposition's possible, a contradiction's impossible. (Certain, possible, impossible: here we have the first indication of the scale that we need in the theory of probability.) (4.464)

• If I cannot say a priori what elementary propositions there are, then the attempt to do so must lead to obvious nonsense. (5.5571)

• The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. (5.6)
  • also: "The limits of my language stand for the limits of my world."

• Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. So we cannot say in logic, 'The world has this in it, and this, but not that.' For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well. We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either. (5.61)

• This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in solipsism. For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said , but makes itself manifest. The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world. (5.62)

• The world and life are one. (5.621)

• I am my world. (The microcosm.) (5.63)

• Death is not an event in life: we do not live to experience death. If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to those who live in the present. Our life has no end in just the way in which our visual field has no limits. (6.4311)

• It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists. (6.44)

• There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical. (6.522)

• My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) (6.54)

• Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. (7)

• The logical picture of the facts is the thought.
  • Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

• The thought is the significant proposition.
  • Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Notes of 1946

• What I give is the morphology of the use of an expression. I show that it has kinds of uses of which you had not dreamed. In philosophy one feels forced to look at a concept in a certain way. What I do is suggest, or even invent, other ways of looking at it. I suggest possibilities of which you had not previously thought. You thought that there was one possibility, or only two at most. But I made you think of others. Furthermore, I made you see that it was absurd to expect the concept to conform to those narrow possibilities.

• A good guide will take you through the more important streets more often than he takes you down side streets; a bad guide will do the opposite. In philosophy I'm a rather bad guide.

Philosophical Investigations

• The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something - because it is always before one's eyes.) The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless that fact has at some time struck him. - And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful. (129)

• "Everything is already there in...." How does it come about that [an] arrow points ? Doesn't it seem to carry in it something besides itself? - "No, not the dead line on paper; only the psychical thing, the meaning, can do that." - That is both true and false. The arrow points only in the application that a living being makes of it. (454)

• My aim is: to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is patent nonsense. (464)

• But if you say: "How am I to know what he means, when I see nothing but the signs he gives?" then I say: "How is he to know what he means, when he has nothing but the signs either?" (504)

• What has to be accepted, the given, is —so one could say —forms of life.

• "Does man think because he has found that thinking pays?

Does he bring his children up because he has found it pays?" (467)

• "So we do sometimes think because it has been found to pay." (470)

On Certainty

On Certainty (Über Gewissheit), J. & J. Harper Editions, New York, 1969

• "94. But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false."

• "144. The child learns to believe a host of things. I.e. it learns to act according to these beliefs. Bit by bit there forms a system of what is believed, and in that systems some things stand unshakeably fast and some are more or less liable to shift. What stands fast does so, not because it is intrinsically obvious or convincing; it is rather held fast by what lies around it."

• "205. If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false."

• "206. If someone asked us 'but is that true?' we might say 'yes' to him; and if he demanded grounds we might say 'I can't give you any grounds, but if you learn more you too will think the same.'"

• "225. What I hold fast to is not one proposition but a nest of propositions."

• "310. A pupil and a teacher. The pupil will not let anything be explained to him, for he continually interrupts with doubts, for instance as to the existence of things, the meaning for words, etc. The teacher says 'Stop interrupting me and do as I tell you. So far your doubts don't make sense at all.'"

• "370. But more correctly: The fact that I use the word 'hand' and all the other words in my sentence without a second thought, indeed that I should stand before the abyss if I wanted so much as to try doubting their meanings--shews that absence of doubt belongs to the essence of the language-game, that the question 'How do I know...' drags out the language-game, or else does away with it."

Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough

Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough (Bermerkungen über Frazers Golden Bough), Brynmill Press Ltd, 1993

• "A religious symbol does not rest on any opinion. And error belongs only with opinion. One would like to say: This is what took place here; laugh, if you can."